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I. INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
In the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent launch of the “war on terror,”1 discussion of the 
issues related to torture gained new momentum. Lawyers and state officials started debating 
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more extensively issues related to the definition of torture, its difference from cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment (hereinafter CIDT), and whether the use of torture and CIDT can be justified 
in certain situations.2 Some States even elaborated innovative ways of outsourcing torture to 
avoid direct culpability by sending suspected terrorists for interrogation purposes to countries 
with solid reputations for systematic use of torture.3 In his 2005 report, the UN Special 
Rapporteur described “increased questioning or compromising of the absolute prohibition on 
torture and all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” as a global phenomenon.4 
Concerns raised by the UN Special Rapporteur resonate with the poll conducted in 2006 
involving 27,000 people from 25 countries.5 Though most countries agreed that the absolute 
prohibition against torture should be maintained even in combating terrorism, one-third 
supported the use of some torture.6  
 
One of the corollaries of the use of torture is the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained 
by it. The use of torture for the purposes of obtaining evidence is certainly not a new 
phenomenon. It can be traced back to Roman-canon law.7 In early modern times, circumstantial 
evidence became insufficient in proving the commission of serious crimes.8 Two other types of 
evidence became recognized as supportive evidence: the testimony of two eyewitnesses and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1
 The term became widely used after the former President G. W. Bush used it in his televised address to a joint 
session of Congress. See, CNN, Transcript of President Bush’s Address, September 21, 2011, available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US (last 
visited March 10, 2011). The Obama administration has been using “Overseas Contingency Operation” instead of 
“War on Terror.” See, S. Wilson & A. Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, March 25, 2005, The 
Washington Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html (last visited March 10, 2011).  
2
 On definition of torture and its difference from CIDT, see M. Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture?: US and 
UN Standards, 28 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 809 (2006); On whether torture should be justified in specific 
circumstances and the critique of this position, see, Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in 
the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture is Morally Justified?, 39 U.S.F.L. REV. 581 (2005); Anna 
O’Rourke et al., Torture, Slippery Slopes, Intellectual Apologists, and Ticking Bombs: An Australian Response to 
Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F.L. REV. 85 (2005).  
3
 Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law, 37 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006); John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular Renditions, 37 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1 (2006).  
4
 Martin Scheinin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, E/CN.4/2006/98, 28 December 2005, Commission on Human 
Rights, 62nd session, Item 17, p. 16.  
5
 BBC, Global Poll: 25 Nations Poll on Torture, October 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6063386.stm 
(last accessed January 24, 2011). 
6
 Two questions asked at the poll were: (a) “Which position is close to yours: Terrorists pose such an extreme threat 
that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that saves innocent 
lives;” (b) “Which position is close to yours: Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of 
torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture.” See, BBC, Global Poll: 25 
Nations Poll on Torture, October 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6063386.stm (last accessed January 
24, 2011). The highest support for the position to use torture in some circumstances came from Israel (43%), Iraq 
(42%), Indonesia (40%), Philippines (40%), Nigeria (39%), Kenya (38%), China (37%), Russia (37%) and USA 
(36%).The highest support for the position to maintain absolute prohibition of torture came from Italy (81%), 
Australia (75%), France (75%), Canada (74%), United Kingdom (72%) and Germany (71%).  
7
 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIENT REGIME 4 (The 
University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
8
 Id. See also, JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE 28 (Alfred A. 
Knopt, 2000).   
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confession of the alleged criminal.9 Because in some situations it was impossible to find two 
eyewitnesses to testify, interrogators used torture to extract confessions. Torture was later 
described as “the queen of proofs.”10 Consequently, it was introduced into the legal process and 
even provided for in criminal codes of European States.11  
Today, it is an internationally agreed position that the evidence obtained by torture should 
not be admissible in any judicial proceeding. This rule is commonly referred to as an 
exclusionary rule.12 Article 15 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 198413 (hereinafter UNCAT) provides for the 
exclusionary rule. It reads  
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been 
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, 
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made. 
 
At first sight, the message of Article 15 is quite straightforward: confessions obtained through 
torture are not admissible in judicial proceedings. However, a closer look at the wording of the 
article reveals that its exclusionary rule applies with regard to evidence only obtained by torture 
and fails to address instances when lesser forms of ill-treatment, namely CIDT, are used to 
extract evidence. The paper addresses this issue. It will first discuss Manfred Nowak’s 
interpretation of Article 15 and argue that, though desirable, his interpretation lacks support both 
from negotiating history, state practice and relevant scholarship. After that, this paper will 
propose that general principles of law can provide a better solution.    
 
II. Manfred Nowak’s Approach and Its Appraisal 
Manfred Nowak provides two reasons why Article 15’s exclusionary rule should be interpreted 
to include evidence obtained by CIDT. The first argument is based on the methods of treaty 
interpretation. For the purposes of clarity, we will quote the relevant part in full:  
A systematic interpretation of Articles 15 and 16 in light of the travaux 
preparatoires as well as the purpose of both Articles leads to the conclusion that 
those [UNCAT] provisions which are directly related to criminal law only apply 
to torture, whereas the more preventive obligations of States apply to all forms of 
ill-treatment. Since Article 15, is, according to its main purpose, directly 
connected to criminal proceedings, one could argue that it applies exclusively to 
                                                          
9
 Id. 
10
 NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
11
 EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 74 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). 
12
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “exclusionary rule” as “[a] rule that excludes or suppresses evidence obtained in 
violation of an accused person’s constitutional rights.” B. A. GARNER (ED.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 647 (9th ed., 
West Publishing, 2009).  
13
 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
24 I.L.M. 535, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). At the time of writing 
of this paper, it had been ratified by 144 States and signed by 74 States. An Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture was adopted in December 18, 2002. It entered into force in June 22, 2006 a. The Optional Protocol 
aims to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by establishing a system of 
regular visits to all places of detention. As of March 21, 2007, it has been ratified by 33 States and signed by 57. 
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torture. On the other hand, Article 15 also has a clear preventive purpose, which 
would support a broader interpretation.14  
 
Nowak formulated his second argument in the following manner: 
Even if Article 15 were applied to other forms of ill-treatment, the result would, 
however, not be that different […]. [I]f interrogation methods aimed at obtaining 
a confession or other information cause severe pain or suffering, then they amount 
not only to cruel and inhuman treatment, but also to torture.15 
 
Nowak’s second argument can be illustrated by the following equation: 
 
 
 
 
An alternative approach to Nowak’s argues that it is the severity of treatment that distinguish 
torture form CIDT. Nigel Rodley, referring to this approach as “pyramid approach,” comments 
that it proposes that only pain reaching certain level of severity can be defined as torture.16 This 
approach can be illustrated by the following diagram: 
 
                                                                      Torture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  Cruel   -  Inhuman  -   Degrading   
 
Because Nowak considered his second argument to be more important than the first one (and 
arguably superseding the first argument),17 we will only address the second argument.  
 
Nowak’s second argument is based on his approach to the issue of what distinguishes torture 
from other forms of ill-treatment, namely CIDT. He argued that the “decisive criteria” that 
distinguishes torture from CIDT is the purpose of conduct rather than its severity.18 If we assume 
                                                          
14
 M. NOWAK & E. MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY  534-535, 
572 (Oxford University Press, 2008).  
15
 Id., pp. 535, 572. 
16
 Sir Nigel Rodley, Reflections on Committee Against Torture General Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y. City L. Rev. 356 
(2007-2008).  
17
 Id., p. 535 (“Even if Article 15 were applied to other forms of ill-treatment, the result would, however, not be that 
different […].” 
18
 Supra note 14, p. 558; See also, M. Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture?: US and UN Standards, 28 
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 809 (2006). On definition of torture and its difference from CIDT, see also, A. Cullen, 
Defining Torture in International Law: A Critique of the Concept Employed by the European Court of Human 
 
CIDT + Purpose of Conduct = Torture 
 
Severe 
Pain 
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the correctness of this approach, then there is no need to worry about the inclusion of CIDT into 
Article 15’s exclusionary rule, because whenever CIDT is used for a specific purpose, e.g. the 
extraction of information, it becomes torture and automatically prohibited by the exclusionary 
rule found in Article 15. This is the gist of Nowak’s second argument. In what follows, we will 
assess the merits of Nowak’s approach. Then, we will look at the scope of the exclusionary rule 
which drafters intended to include in the UNCAT. After that, we will investigate relevant case 
law and scholarship with the aim of identifying if Nowak’s approach enjoys support. It will be 
concluded that Nowak’s approach, although desirable, enjoys little support. 
 
a. Purpose vs. Severity Argument 
The issue of what distinguishes torture from CIDT should start with discussing the definition of 
torture. UNCAT is the most authoritative source that defines torture.19 Its Article 1, in part, 
reads: 
[t]he term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. […]. 
 
The definition mentions four key elements that together constitute torture. These elements are: 
[1] the requirement of severity; [2] the purpose of the conduct; [3] the identity of the offender; 
and [4] intent. Because this part discusses Nowak’s approach on what distinguishes torture from 
CIDT, we will analyze only two most contentious elements of torture definition: elements of 
severity and purpose.  
 
As it was mentioned earlier, Nowak’s second argument argued that the “decisive criteria” that 
distinguishes torture from CIDT is the purpose of conduct rather than its severity.20 The list of 
purposes provided in UNCAT’s Article 1 can be summarized as follows: (a) obtaining 
information or confession from the victim or the third person; (b) punishing the victim or the 
third person; (c) intimidating or coercing the victim or the third person; (d) discriminating 
against the victim or the third person.21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rights, 34 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 29 (2003-2004); M. D. Evans, Getting to Grips With Torture, 51 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 
365 (2002); N. S. Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, 55 Current Legal Problems 467 (2002). 
19
 In Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) 
recognized that the definition provided in the Convention against Torture should apply to any rule of international 
law on torture. See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sept. 1998, para. 593. See 
also Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment 10 December 1998, para. 160; Prosecutor v. 
Delalic and Others, Case IT-96-21-T, Judgment 16 November 1998, para. 45.   
20
 Supra note 14, p. 558; See also, supra note 17, M. Nowak. 
21
 This list is not exhaustive because Article 1 introduces these purposes with the use of “such purposes as” clause. 
This position is also confirmed by the fact that most delegations agreed during the drafting of the article that the list 
was indicative rather than exhaustive. See, supra note 14, M. NOWAK & E. MCARTHUR, p. 75. 
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In constructing his argument, Nowak draws support from the decisions of the European 
Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter European Commission) in the Greek22 and 1976 
Northern Ireland case.23 In Greek case, the European Commission dealt with the allegations of 
torture.24 It held that torture is “inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of 
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated 
form of inhuman treatment.”25 Though this statement does not clearly state that it is the purpose 
of conduct that distinguishes torture from CIDT, Nowak interprets it as qualifying purposive 
element to be “the critical distinguishing criterion in the definition of torture.”26 The second case 
that Nowak refers too, the 1976 Northern Ireland case, is also not clear on what distinguishes 
torture from CIDT. This case was decided a year later after the European Commission’s decision 
in the Greek case. The European Commission, applying the interpretation of torture adopted in 
the Greek case,27 held that it was the specific purpose and severity of pain and suffering that 
distinguished torture from inhuman and degrading treatment.28 From the above discussion, it is 
obvious that the European Commission in Greek and 1976 Northern Ireland cases did not 
explicitly state what distinguished torture from inhuman and degrading treatment. It considered 
both severity and purposive elements to be of crucial importance in distinguishing torture from 
other forms of ill-treatment.  
 
An alternative approach to Nowak’s argues that it is the severity requirement that distinguishes 
torture from CIDT. Article 1 of the UNCAT provides for the severity element (“any act by which 
severe pain or suffering is inflicted”). There is considerable amount of support that the drafters 
considered severity element in the definition of torture as the key element in distinguishing 
torture from CIDT. During the adoption of the U.N. Declaration against Torture in 1975, the UN 
members included the idea of aggravation in the definition of torture.29 Article 1(2) of the 
Declaration reads: “Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” It should also be noted that at the time of the adoption of 
the Declaration against Torture in 1975 and early discussions on the adoption of the UNCAT, 
some States were of opinion that the requirement of purpose was not a decisive element in the 
definition of torture, with France even expressing a view that the purposive element was 
                                                          
22
 The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (European Commission on Human Rights) (hereinafter Greek 
Case).     
23
 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 512 (European Commission on Human Rights) 
(hereinafter 1976 Northern Ireland case). The case was initiated by Ireland in 1971 by submitting an application to 
the European Commission alleging, among others, that the use of five interrogation techniques by British security 
forces constituted breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Five interrogation techniques 
were wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food and drink. 
24
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950. Its 
Article 3 reads: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
25
 Supra note 21, The Greek Case, p. 186.  
26
 Supra note 2, Nowak, p. 820 (“In the Greek Case, the Commission took the position that the severity of pain or 
suffering distinguishes inhuman treatment, including torture, from other treatment, whereas the purpose of such 
conduct is the critical distinguishing criterion between torture and inhuman treatment.”). 
27
 Id., p. 750. (“As in the Greek Case, the Commission considers in this case that any definition of the provisions of 
Article 3 of the Convention must start from the notion of “inhuman treatment” and it maintains that the basic 
elements of that notion are those given in the Greek Case.”) 
28
 Id., pp. 748, 750. 
29
 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 9, 1975, G.A.Res. 3452 (XXX) (1975).  
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irrelevant.30 At the time of drafting of Article 1 of the UNCAT, there were numerous proposals 
with regard to the formulation of the severity requirement. The former Soviet Union delegation 
was against using the word “severe” at all.31 The American delegation proposed that torture be 
defined as “include[ing] any act by which extremely severe pain or suffering […] is deliberately 
and maliciously inflicted on a person.”32 The British delegation proposed an even more 
restrictive definition of torture than Americans. The British suggested that torture be defined as 
the “systematic and intentional infliction of extreme pain or suffering rather than intentional 
infliction of severe pain or suffering.”33 The Swiss delegation proposed not to distinguish torture 
from CIDT on the basis of severity of suffering.34 Drafters finally agreed on the phrase “severe 
pain” and considered it to be sufficient to convey the idea that only acts of certain gravity may be 
qualified to constitute torture.35  
 
Interestingly, despite the above-discussed developments, the definition of torture adopted in the 
UNCAT neither mentions torture as an aggravated form of inhuman or degrading treatment, nor 
makes the intensity of pain a criterion distinguishing torture from CIDT. It includes the severity 
requirement, along with the requirement of purpose, among other requirements, but does not 
make it a decisive criterion in distinguishing torture from CIDT. Nevertheless, later case law 
demonstrates that adjudicators considered the severity requirement as a decisive criterion in 
distinguishing torture from CIDT. In Aksoy v. Turkey, the European Court stressed that the 
“distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to allow the special stigma 
of ‘torture’ to attach only to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering.” The Selmouni case36 is generally seen as a case that marked a change in the European 
Court’s approach of determining torture. Relying on the “living instrument” doctrine of treaty 
interpretation, the European Court in that case held that “[c]ertain acts which were classified in 
the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be classified 
differently in the future.”37 The approach taken in the Selmouni case signals a change in how the 
severity requirement of torture definition should be perceived nowadays. However, it does not 
propose that the severity requirement should play a less important role in distinguishing CIDT 
from torture than the requirement of purpose.  
 
In a number of cases, the ICTY also relied on the severity requirement in distinguishing torture 
from lesser forms of ill-treatment. In the Delalic case, the Trial Chamber held that 
“[m]istreatment that does not rise to the level of severity necessary to be characterized as torture 
may constitute another offence.”38 It further added that inhuman treatment is treatment that 
“deliberately causes serious mental or physical suffering that falls short of the severe mental and 
                                                          
30
 J. HERMAN BURGERS AND HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A 
HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR 
PUNISHMENT 47 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988). 
31
 AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 16 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1999). 
32
 Supra note 29, BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, p. 41. 
33
 Supra note 29, BURGERS & DANELIUS, pp. 41-45, 117. See also, supra note 30, BOULESBAA, 16. 
34
 Id., BOULESBAA, p. 16. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Selmouni v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 28 July 1999. 
37
 Id., para 101.  
38
 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, Nov. 16, 1998, paras. 462-468. 
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physical suffering required for the offence of torture.”39 The ICTY reiterated the same position in 
the Kvocka case. Referring to the ruling in Delalic case, the Trial Chamber held that “the 
severity of the pain or suffering is a distinguishing characteristic of torture that sets it apart from 
similar offences.”40 
 
Compared to the above cases where it was explicitly stated that it is the severity of treatment that 
distinguishing torture from CIDT, there were no cases where courts explicitly stated that it is the 
purpose of conduct that distinguishes torture from CIDT.  
 
b. Scope of UNCAT’s Exclusionary Rule 
In this section we will look at what drafters intended as regards the scope of UNCAT’s 
exclusionary rule.  
 
During the drafting of UNCAT, there were several proposals to prohibit evidence obtained by 
CIDT. The predecessor of the U.N. Convention against Torture, the U.N. Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment and Punishment (hereinafter The U.N. Declaration against Torture)41 in its 
Article 12 required the exclusion of evidence obtained not only by torture, but also by CIDT. It 
was reported that the Swiss draft’s exclusionary rule included CIDT as well.42 The International 
Commission of Jurists was also in favor of reading Article 15 as to include CIDT.43 Despite 
these proposals, drafters could not reach any agreement about whether the exclusionary rule 
should apply to information obtained by CIDT either by direct inclusion of CIDT in Article 15 or 
reference to Article 15 in Article 16.44 Another commentator even noted that there was no 
serious debate about the omission of CIDT from UNCAT’s exclusionary rule.45 Eventually 
CIDT was not included into the final draft to Article 15.  
 
The issue of prohibiting CIDT was addressed by drafting a separate article. Drafters included the 
prohibition of CIDT in Article 16 of UNCAT that reads: 
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent […] other acts of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in 
article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall 
apply with the substitution for references to torture or references to other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
                                                          
39
 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, Nov. 16, 1998, para. 542. 
40
 Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, Nov. 2, 2001, para. 142.  
41
 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 9, 1975, G.A.Res. 3452 (XXX) (1975). 
42
 Supra note 29, BURGERS & DANELIUS, p. 69.  
43
 The International Commission of Jurist proposing its version of article 16, which is about the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, submitted the following wording: “Each State Party shall take effective measures 
to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
which do not amount to torture […]. In particular, the obligations contained in [article 15] shall apply with the 
substitution for references to torture or references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” See, id., BURGERS & DANELIUS, p. 71.  
44
 Supra note 29, BURGERS & DANELIUS, pp. 70-71, 95-96, 147-150. 
45
 Supra note 29, BURGERS & DANELIUS; Supra note 30, BOULESBAA, p. 16. 
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As can be noticed, in addition to prohibiting CIDT, Article 16 makes four other UNCAT articles 
applicable to CIDT. These are Articles 10,46 11,47 1248 and 13.49 Article 15 is not mentioned 
among the articles. Commentators on the drafting history of the UNCAT reported that though 
several delegations proposed to extend the scope of Article 16 to prohibit evidence obtained by 
CIDT, such a proposal was not adopted.50  
 
It is important to note that the clause in Article 16 that introduces Articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 to be 
applicable to CIDT starts with the phrase “[i]n particular.” There is disagreement with regard to 
what exactly “in particular” means. The first President of the U.N. Committee against Torture 
indicated that all provisions of UNCAT were applicable to CIDT.51 Chris Ingelse disagreed with 
such an interpretation.52 He wrote that the first President of the U.N. Committee against Torture 
went “very far by stating without basis that all rules of the Convention mutatis mutandis are 
applicable to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”53 Nowak proposed a 
different approach. He holds the view that the number of articles mentioned in Article 16 should 
not be understood to be inclusive or exclusive.54 He commented that the application of all 
provisions of the UNCAT with regard to CIDT depends on the purpose of the article. If the 
article’s main purpose is prosecution, then it is applicable only to torture.55 If the article has a 
purpose of preventing torturous acts, then it is applicable to CIDT as well.56 As was mentioned 
                                                          
46
 Article 10 of the U.N. Convention against Torture reads: “(1) Each State Party shall ensure that education and 
information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, 
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, 
interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment; (2) Each 
State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of 
any such persons.” 
47
 Article 11 of U.N. Convention against Torture reads: “Each State Party shall keep under systematic review 
interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of 
persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view 
to preventing any cases of torture” 
48
 Article 12 of U.N. Convention against Torture reads: “Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities 
proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture 
has been committee in any territory under its jurisdiction.” 
49
 Article 13 of U.N. Convention against Torture reads: “Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who 
alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to and to have 
his case promptly and impartially examined its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the 
complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint 
or any evidence given.” 
50
 Supra note 29, BURGERS & DANELIUS, p. 147; See also, Supra note 14, NOWAK, p. 507. 
51
 Supra note 14, NOWAK, p. 570. 
52
 CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 248 (Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
53
 Id. 
54
 Supra note 14, NOWAK, pp. 570-575. “Since an agreement [to include reference to Article 15 in Article 16] could 
not be reached, these references were deleted from the draft, and the words ‘in particular’ added in order to show 
that this reference is not exhaustive.” 
55
 Id., p. 571. He wrote: “[a]ll obligations of States parties to use domestic criminal law for the purpose of 
investigating any crime of torture and bringing the perpetrators to justice shall not be applied to other forms of ill-
treatment, notwithstanding the fact that the use of criminal law, of course, also has a preventive effect.” 
56
 Id. He wrote: “[t]he obligation to prevent torture by means of education and training, by systematically reviewing 
interrogation rules and practices, by ensuring a prompt and impartial ex officio investigation, and by ensuring an 
effective complaint mechanism […] must be applied equally to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.” 
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earlier, it is not clear if Article 15 serves purely preventive or prosecutorial functions and 
consequently if it can be regarded as either inclusive or exclusive in Article 16.  
 
Our analysis of the UNCAT’s negotiation history so far demonstrates at least two things. First, 
drafters did not intend to include CIDT in UNCAT’s exclusionary rule. Second, the very fact that 
drafters discussed at length whether to include CIDT or not in Article 15’s exclusionary rule 
indicates that they did not consider the purposive element of torture to constitute a decisive 
criterion in distinguishing torture from CIDT. If this was the case, why would drafter engage into 
lengthy discussions on whether to CIDT in UNCAT’s exclusionary rule or not? If the majority of 
drafters held the view that it was the purpose of ill-treatment that distinguishes torture from 
CIDT, then there was no need to include CIDT in Article 15’s exclusionary rule that only 
prohibits the admissibility of evidence by torture.  
 
To conclude, it appears that the negotiating history demonstrates that drafters wanted UNCAT’s 
exclusionary rule to apply only to evidence obtained by torture. The very fact that drafters 
debated whether CIDT should be included in Article 15’s exclusionary rule also demonstrates 
that they did not consider the purposive element as a decisive criterion in distinguishing torture 
from CIDT. 
 
c. Recent Practice 
Recent practice of international organizations and governmental institutions also demonstrates 
that the purposive element in the torture definition is not a decisive criterion in differentiating it 
from CIDT.  
 
The United Nations Committee against Torture (Committee against Torture) is the body 
responsible for monitoring implementation of the UNCAT. As part of its mandate, it issues 
general comments on the application/implementation of UNCAT articles. It is unfortunate that so 
far it has only issued two general comments: one on Article 3 (principles of non-refoulement) in 
199657 and Article 2 (obligation to prevent torture and absolute prohibition against it) in 2007.58 
Considering the importance of the prohibition of torture and CIDT and the need for interpretative 
guidance of UNCAT’s articles, the number of general comments issues by the Committee 
against Torture since 1984 is extremely modest. Of these two general comments, none concretely 
addresses the scope of either Article 15 or 16. The only reference to the application of UNCAT 
provisions to CIDT can be found in the General Comment #2, where the Committee against 
Torture noted that it “considers that articles 3-15 are […] obligatory as applied to both torture 
and ill-treatment.”59  
                                                          
57
 General Comment No. 1, Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22 
(Refoulement and Communications), A/53/44, November 21, 1997, available at at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/comments.htm (last visited on March 24, 2011).    
58
 General Comment No. 2, Implementation of Article 2 by States parties, Committee against Torture, CAT/C/GC/2, 
January 24, 2008, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/comments.htm (last visited on March 24, 
2011). For the insightful discussion of the importance of General Comment #2 for the prevention of torture, see, 
Preventing Torture: “Implementation of Article 2 by the States Parties of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:” A Symposium, 11 N.Y. City L. Rev. 179 (2007-
2008).   
59
 General Comment No. 2, Implementation of Article 2 by States parties, Committee against Torture, CAT/C/GC/2, 
January 24, 2008, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/comments.htm (last visited on March 24, 
2011), para. 6.  
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It is of note that the General Comment #2 provides that obligations to prevent torture and CIDT 
are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated, and that “[t]he obligation to prevent ill-treatment 
in practice overlaps with and is largely congruent with the obligation to prevent torture.”60 More 
importantly, it also provides that becauase the “[e]xperience demonstrates that the conditions that 
give rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures required to 
prevent torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment,” the prohibition of ill-treatment should 
be considered to be of non-derogable nature.61 
 
This position conflicts with the Committee against Torture’s earlier decision. In Hajrizi Dzemajl 
et al. v. Yugoslavia, the Committee against Torture held that the list of Articles referred to in 
Article 16 is exclusive. Deliberating over the question whether Article 1462 of UNCAT was 
included in Article 16, the U.N. Committee against Torture commented 
Concerning the alleged violation of article 14 of the [UNCAT], the [Committee 
against Torture] notes that the scope of application of the said provision only 
refers to torture in the sense of article 1 of the [UNCAT] and does not cover other 
forms of ill-treatment. Moreover, article 16, paragraph 1, of the Convention while 
specifically referring to articles 10, 11, 12, and 13, does not mention article 14 of 
the Convention.63    
 
Paragraph 3 of the General Comment #2 appears to attempt to fix this problem because it 
provides 
Article 16, identifying the means of prevention of ill-treatment, emphasizes “in 
particular” the measures outlined in articles 10 to 13, but does not limit effective 
prevention to these articles, as the Committee has explained, for example, with 
respect to compensation in article 14. 
 
 
It should be noted that under Nowak’s proposal,64 Article 14 should be read to fall under the 
scope of Article 16 because Article 14’s main purpose is not persecution as such. Because 
Article 14 deals with the right of the torture victims’ compensation, it is more about prevention 
than persecution per se. But contrary to Nowak’s approach, the Committee against Torture held 
that Article 14 does not fall under the scope of Article 16.    
                                                          
60
 General Comment No. 2, Implementation of Article 2 by States parties, Committee against Torture, CAT/C/GC/2, 
January 24, 2008, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/comments.htm (last visited on March 24, 
2011), para. 3. 
61
 General Comment No. 2, Implementation of Article 2 by States parties, Committee against Torture, CAT/C/GC/2, 
January 24, 2008, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/comments.htm (last visited on March 24, 
2011), para. 3. 
62
 Article 14 of the UNCAT reads: (1) Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of 
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as 
full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents 
shall be entitled to compensation; (2) Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other person to 
compensation which may exist under national law.  
63
 Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, No. 161/2000, para. 9.6. 
64
 Supra note 14, p. 571. He wrote: “[a]ll obligations of States parties to use domestic criminal law for the purpose 
of investigating any crime of torture and bringing the perpetrators to justice shall not be applied to other forms of ill-
treatment, notwithstanding the fact that the use of criminal law, of course, also has a preventive effect.”  
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The British House of Lords considered, among others, UNCAT’s Article 15 in A and Others v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005). Discussing the scope of the exclusionary 
rule provided in Article 15 of the UNCAT, Lord Bingham implied that it only extends to the 
admissibility of evidence obtained by torture and not cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.65 
Lord Hope’s opinion was the most straightforward on this issue. According to him, UNCAT’s 
exclusionary rule found in Article 15 “extends to statements obtained by the use of torture, not to 
those obtained by the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”66  More 
specifically, he added that “[t]o trigger the exclusion, it must be shown that the statement in 
question has been obtained by torture.”67 Interestingly, although the Lords stated that UNCAT’s 
exclusionary rule does not include evidence obtained by CIDT, they did not even question the 
soundness of UNCAT’s exclusionary rule and thus the potential of interpreting it in a different 
way. This is despite the fact that the relevant English law on the exclusionary rule states that 
evidence obtained by the infliction of coercion is inadmissible.68   
 
Several memoranda issued by the U.S. Department of Justice also illustrate lack of agreement 
with regard to what legal obligations UNCAT’s Article 15 and 16 entail. The 2002 Bybee 
Memo, for example, interpreted UNCAT’s Article 16 in such a way as proposing that “states 
must endeavor to prevent CIDT,” but “states need not criminalize, leaving [CIDT] without the 
stigma of criminal penalties.”69 Interestingly, the 2004 Memo70 that replaced the 2002 Bybee 
Memo, although it addressed in detail the issue of specific intent and the threshold of severity for 
the definition of torture, did not talk about CIDT. 
 
The Military Commission Act of 2006 (2006 MCA) expressly authorized the admission of 
statements obtained by coercion, which includes CIDT, before the enactment of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005. It provided that “the totality of the circumstances renders the statements 
reliable and possessing sufficient probative value”71 and their introduction serves the “best 
interest of justice.”72 As for the statements obtained after the enactment of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Section 948r(d) of the 2006 MCA provides that statements obtained by 
coercion may be admitted only if (1) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement 
reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; (2) the interests of justice would best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence; and (3) the interrogation methods used to 
obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment prohibited by 
                                                          
65
 Para. 53: “Ill-treatment falling short of torture may invite exclusion of evidence as adversely affecting the fairness 
of a proceeding under section 78 of the 1984 Act, where that section applies. But I do not think the authorities on the 
Torture Convention justify the assimilation of these two kinds of abusive conduct. Special rules have always been 
thought to apply to torture, and for the present at least must continue to do so.” 
66
 Para. 126, Lord Hope.  
67
 Para. 138, Lord Hope.  
68
 See the discussion of the British exclusionary rule with regard to CIDT evidence below in the “State Practice” 
section. 
69
 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC. 
## 2340-2340A, August 1, 2002.  
70
 Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, 
Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 USC. ## 2340-2340A, 30 December 2004.  
71
 Military Commission Act of 2006, Sec. 948r.(c)(1). 
72
 Military Commission Act of 2006, Sec. 948r.(c)(2). 
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section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. Though Section 948r(d) of the 2006 MCA 
prohibited the admissibility of evidence obtained by CIDT, it also means that the US position 
does not favor the purposive element as a decisive criterion in distinguishing torture from CIDT.       
 
It can be concluded that recent state practice demonstrates that States do not consider purposive 
element as a decisive criterion in differentiating torture from CIDT. 
 
d. Review of Relevant Scholarship 
Leading scholars on the topics related to the definition of torture and the inadmissibility of 
evidence obtained by it wrote very little on how international law should address the issue of the 
admissibility of evidence obtained by CIDT. Some scholars acknowledged the problem but 
failed to propose solutions. Malcolm Evans is one of them. His position about what distinguishes 
torture from CIDT coincides with Nowak’s,73 but he elaborated very little about the failure of 
Article 15 to include evidence obtained by CIDT and how to remedy this problem. Criticizing 
how the House of Lords in A and Others case resolved the issue of the admissibility of foreign 
torture evidence, Evans did not discuss how taking purpose as a decisive criterion in 
distinguishing torture from CIDT impacts interpretation of Article 15’s exclusionary rule.74 
Rather, he mainly criticized the House of Lords’ focus on the difference between torture and 
CIDT. He argued that for the purposes of the human rights law States are obliged to refrain from 
both torture and CIDT.75  
 
Other groups of scholars who wrote on the admissibility of torture evidence in international law 
appear to either ignore or avoid discussing the issue of the admissibility of CIDT evidence in 
international law. In 2009, Kia Ambos published an article on transnational use of torture 
evidence.76 The article discusses the rationale of the exclusionary rule and the law of 
international and national criminal tribunals, but does not address the issue of transnational use 
of evidence obtained by CIDT. Tobias Thienel wrote two articles on the issue of the 
admissibility of torture evidence: the first addressed the admissibility of torture evidence in 
international law77 and the second discussed the House of Lords’ decision in A and Others 
case.
78
 In neither of the articles did Thienel address Article 15’s failure to extend its exclusionary 
rule to CIDT evidence. Similarly, Rosemary Pattenden also addressed the issue of the 
admissibility of evidence obtained by torture but said very little about the admissibility of CIDT 
evidence.79 
                                                          
73
 M. D. Evans, Getting to Grips with Torture, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 382 (2002) (“The first question to be asked 
would be whether the form of ill-treatment or punishment is sufficiently serious to be deemed ‘inhuman.’ If that 
threshold is met, then the next question is whether the ill-treatment was purposive (in the sense of the Article 1 of 
the UN Convention). If it was, then it should be characterized as ‘torture.’ It should not be necessary for the 
‘suffering’ to be of a greater severity as well. It is the very fact of its purposive use that is the ‘aggravating factor.’”)  
74
 Malcolm D. Evans, ‘All the Perfumes of Arabia’: The House of Lords and ‘Foreign Torture Evidence,’ 19 LEIDEN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1125, 1132-1133 (2006). 
75
 Id., p. 1130. 
76
 Kai Ambos, The Transnational Use of Torture Evidence, ISRAEL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 42, no. 2 (2009). 
77
 Tobias Thienel, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture Under International Law, 17 THE EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. no. 2, 349-367 (2006).  
78
 Tobias Thienel, Foreign Acts of Torture and the Admissibility of Evidence: The Judgment of the House of Lords in 
A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2), 4 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 401 (2006). 
79
 Rosemary Pattenden, Admissibility in Criminal Proceedings of Third Party and Real Evidence Obtained by 
Methods Prohibited by UNCAT, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 8 (2006). 
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It can be concluded that scholarship on the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained by 
torture rarely addressed the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained by CIDT. Even when 
scholars addressed this issue, they did not rely on Nowak’s approach. 
 
III. General Principles of Law as a More Coherent Solution 
This section will look at what guidance general principles of law provide with regard to 
international law standards as applied to the exclusion of CIDT evidence. As was established in 
the previous sections, Article 15 of CAT prohibits evidence only obtained by torture and does 
not prohibit the admissibility of CIDT evidence. This section will demonstrate that general 
principles of law provide better guidance.    
 
a. Preliminary Remarks 
An ordinary starting point for international lawyers when thinking about the sources of 
international law is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter 
ICJ).80 Though Article 38 is not an exhaustive list of international law sources, it lists those 
materials that an adjudicator should consider when deciding disputes. Article 38(1)(c) provides 
that the ICJ should apply “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” to 
resolve disputes.81  
 
It was reported that general principles of law were included in Article 38 because there were 
fewer decided cases in international law than in municipal law and that there was no unified 
method of lawmaking to provide rules to govern new situations as they arise.82 In a similar line, 
Shaw wrote: 
[i]n a system of law, a situation may very well arise where the court in 
considering a case before it realizes that there is no law covering exactly that 
point, neither parliamentary statute not judicial precedent. […] Such a situation is 
perhaps even more likely to arise in international law because of the relative 
underdevelopment of the system in relation to the needs with which it is faced.83  
 
P. Weil wrote that international law has two “self-curative methods” to address gaps in law: 
recourse to general principles of law and to equity.84 F. Jalet agrees with this position. Writing 
                                                          
80
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945. It is widely recognized as the most authoritative 
statement that enumerates sources of international law. See, I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (7th ed., Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 5; L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (R. Y. 
Jennings et al. eds., Longmans 9th ed., 1992).  
81
 Article 38 reads: The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
82
 F. Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations – A Study, 10 UCLA L. 
REV. 1055-1063 (1961-1962).  
83
 M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 92-93 (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
84
 P. Weil, “The Court Cannot Conclude Definitely…” Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONLA LAW 110 (1998). 
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about the importance of having general principles of law as a separate source of international 
law, F. Jalet noted 
Without the ability to resort to general principles, decisions in many cases could 
not be made. This is true of all law, but has special significance in international 
law which is more susceptible to the need for such principles to fill gaps and to 
remedy its deficiencies […].85 
 
Similar reasons for referring to general principles of law in order to resolve gaps in the law were 
expressed by other scholars too.86  
 
Although general principles of law started with the function of filling gaps, its modern 
importance goes beyond that. Raimondo wrote that general principles of law might serve 
important roles in (a) interpreting legal rules and (b) reinforcing legal reasoning.87 Allen Pellet 
agrees with Raimondo. He wrote that “judges […] resort to general principles in order either to 
interpret a customary or treaty rule or to strengthen an argument based on a rule from another 
origin.88 For Lammers, in addition to “the interpretation function,” general principles of law play 
“the corrective function” because they may “set aside or modify provisions of conventional or 
customary law.”89 He also mentioned about “the formative/persuasive function” of the general 
principles of law is that it “may exert influence on the formation of conventional and customary 
international law [by inspiring] the framers of treaties or the initiators of a certain practice of 
States.” 90  
 
b. Contemporary Definition - What Do “General Principles of Law” Mean? 
There are varying views on the nature of general principles of law. B. Cheng wrote that general 
principles of law do not consist of specific rules but are general propositions that express the 
essential qualities of juridical truth itself.91 He also described general principles of law as 
“cardinal principles of the legal system, in the light of which international […] law is to be 
interpreted and applied.”92 O. Schachter described general principles of law as “an appeal to 
reason and moral ideas.”93 As some ideas associated with general principles of law, he listed, 
among others, principles intrinsic to the idea of law, reasonableness, fairness, natural justice and 
good faith.94 For M. E. O’Connell, general principles of law are “principles inherent in law and 
                                                          
85
 Supra note 79, Jalet, 1056. 
86
 See M. Janis - “Sometimes neither treaties nor custom provide a rule to decide a case involving international law. 
Then the judge … may look outside the theoretically consensual sources to non-consensual sources.” See also, S. 
Nasser, Sources and Norms of International Law: A Study on Soft Law, Mobility and Norm Change, Volume 7 
(Galda+Wilch Verlag, 2008), pp. 64-67. 
87
 F. O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, pp. 7, 34-35. 
88
 A. Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 781 (A. 
Zimmermann et al. (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2006). 
89
 J. G. Lammers, General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 64-65 (F. Kalshoven et al., (eds.), Sitjhoff & Noordhoff Publishers, 1980). 
90
 Id. 
91
 B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 24 (Grotius 
Publications, 1987).  
92
 Id. 
93
 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law, RECUEIL 
DES COURS, 1982-V, p. 74. 
94
 Id.  
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often essential to the application of justice.”95 Indeed, it was reported that Lord Phillimore 
understood general principles of law to be “maxims of law.”96 For Gordon Christenson, general 
principles of law are “foundational ordering norms in a global, interdependent community.”97 
For Alain Pellet, there was little doubt that general principles of law possess the following 
characters: they are unwritten legal norms of a wide-ranging character, they are recognized in the 
municipal laws of States and they must be transposable at the international level.98 The above 
descriptions of general principles of law resonate with natural law. Vedross believed that the 
effect of including general principles of law in Article 38 was to incorporate natural law into 
international law.99 Identifying general principles of law with natural law, Hersch Lauterpacht 
wrote that general principles of law are “a modern version of the law of nature.”100 
 
An alternative view is that general principles of law are rules found in major legal systems. E. 
Root and Lord Phillimore understood general principles of law in terms of rules accepted in the 
domestic law of all civilized states.101 This view received strongest support and approval in 
subsequent case law and scholarly writings. For Schlesinger, general principles are “a core of 
legal ideas which are common to all civilized legal systems.”102 Judge Ammoun defined general 
principles of law as constituting “nothing other than the norms common to the different 
legislations of the world […].”103 S. Naser wrote that general principles of law refer to those 
norms that are found in and recognized by the various domestic legal systems.104  
 
Judge Tanaka attempted to provide an explanation why there are two major views on what 
constitute general principles of law. After noting that some natural law elements are inherent in 
Article 38(1)(c), he also wrote that the article was “the product of a compromise between two 
schools, naturalist and positivist, and therefore the fact that the natural law idea became 
incorporated therein is not difficult to discover.”105 Mary Ellen O’Connell unites both positions 
by summarizing that general principles of law have two categories: the first category is 
composed of natural law and is inherent in legal systems; the second category is composed of 
positive law of national systems.106  
 
We think that it is impossible to take either position with regard to general principles of law, i.e. 
either as being composed of natural law or rules common to major legal systems. The fact that 
                                                          
95
 M. E. O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 143 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
96
 Supra note 88, B. Cheng, p. 24. 
97
 G. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 
587 (1988).  
98
 Supre note 85, A. Pellet, p. 766. 
99
 M. DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed., Blackstone Press Limited, 2000), p. 39. 
100
 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Stevens & Sons, London, 1950). 
101
 I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (7th ed., Oxford University Press, 2008). 
102
 R. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 
734, 73 (1957).   
103
 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 132-140 (Separate Opinion by Judge Fouad 
Ammoun). 
104
 S. NASSER, SOURCES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY ON SOFT LAW (MOBILITY AND NORM 
CHANGE) 65 (Galda+Wilch Verlag, 1st ed., 2008). 
105
 Judge Tanaka’s dissenting opinion in South West Africa Case 
106
 M. E. O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 57 (6th ed., Foundation 
Press, 2010). 
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later scholarship tended to define general principles of law as constituting rules common to 
major legal systems reflects the development of international law. When the idea of general 
principles of law was proposed, it was impossible at that moment to propose that those were the 
rules inherent in different legal systems and thus scholars relied on natural law in defining 
general principles of law. Defining general principles of law as rules inherent in different legal 
systems gives general principles of law more concreteness. The early reference to natural law 
was open to attack because (a) it was difficult to come to an unanimous decision with regard to 
what natural law meant and what rules should be regarded as natural law and (b) at the time of 
the adoption of PCIJ and ICJ Statutes, international legal order was more positivist than it is 
now. Thus, by defining general principles of law to be composed of rules inherent in different 
legal systems, scholars gave them more concreteness. Later approach kept natural law origins of 
general principles of law too because for a rule to be present in various legal systems, it should 
be recognized as one of the most essential rules for the proper functioning of the legal system. 
For example, the following fundamental rules are present in all legal systems: no one shall be a 
judge in his own cause; equality of parties before the tribunal; victim of a legal wrong is entitled 
to reparation; res judicata; lex specialis derogate legi generalis; lex posterior derogate legi 
priori, etc.  
 
It can be concluded that although general principles of law might have had natural law origins, 
today they are widely considered to be norms common to different domestic legal systems. In 
what follows, we will address the issue of how we can derive a general principle of law from 
domestic legal systems.  
 
c. How to Determine Existence of General Principles of Law?107 
Identifying the existence of a general principle of law by studying different domestic laws is a 
challenging task. We cannot think of the existence of a general principle of law when a principle 
is only found in a few national legislations, however important and well-developed those systems 
might be. At the same time, it is unrealistic to insist that a principle be found in every national 
legal system before it becomes a general principle of law. To address these questions, 
international law scholars have developed various methods of determining general principles of 
law. In general, there are two approaches: “comparativist” and “categorist.”108 The comparativist 
approach is based on Lord Phillimore’s position according to which general principles of law are 
those accepted by all States in foro domestico.109 M. Akehurst wrote that general principles of 
law can be “verified by a scientific study of the law of different States”110 and considered it a 
reliable way proving their existence.111 Similarly, for J. Hathaway general principles of law are 
“derived from domestic standards present in the legal cultures of a significant majority of 
                                                          
107
 Elsewhere, the question was formulated as “How ‘general’ must the occurrence of principles of law in domestic 
legal systems be in order to constitute ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’?,” See, J. H. Currie 
et al., International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory, Irwin Law, 2007, p. 149.  
108
 C. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and ‘General Principles of Law,’ 5 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 65-75 (1994). See also, J. H. CURRIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINE, 
PRACTICE, AND THEORY 149-150 (Irwin Law, 2007).  
109
 Supra note 98, I. BROWNLIE, 16; G.J.J. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 
(Kulwer Academic Publishers, 1983).  
110
 Id.  
111
 M. Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 818 (1976). 
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states.”112 Differentiating how general principles of law develop from how customary law does, 
Hathaway wrote that general principles of law “[are] established not on the basis of uniform state 
practice as under custom, but by virtue of the consistency of domestic laws across a significant 
range of countries.”113 The ICTY adopted a similar approach in analyzing “world’s legal 
systems” to derive a general principle of law in its numerous decisions.114 In Prosecutor v. 
Kurpeskic et al., the ICTY held that in order to fill gaps in international treaty and customary 
law, an adjudicator “may draw upon general principles of criminal law as they derive from the 
convergence of the principal penal systems of the world.115 The Rome Statute, if seen as one of 
the most recent codifications of the source of law that judges at the ICC should employ, adopts 
the approach that GPL are derived “from national laws of legal systems of the world.”116 
 
Scholars117 usually refer to the Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory118 as an 
example of this approach. In this case, Portugal studied the national laws of sixty-four states with 
the purpose of deriving a general principle of law relating to the right of passage in enclave 
territory.119 The advantage of approaching the legal issue through the means of the comparative 
law method, in the words of Johan Lammers, “has the merit of scientific verifiability and 
constitutes a proper defense against complaints of subjectivism in the determination of general 
principles of law.”120 This way, the comparativist approach would also address one of the 
critiques raised by Soviet scholars of international law that in an attempt to determine the content 
of “general principles of law,” Western scholars rarely make a comparative study of all the 
systems of municipal law, limiting themselves to several Western systems and ignoring the law 
of Asian, African and Socialist states.121  
 
Despite its merits, the comparative approach has one major disadvantage. Undertaking 
comparative research is an extremely time-consuming and arguably unrealistic task for several 
reasons. First, the required material on a specific legislation might not be available either because 
of logistical problems of finding necessary legal provision or because of language barriers. 
Second, not all judges might have comparative law experience. This might result in the 
reluctance to carry out full-scale comparative analyses of different legal systems and/or spending 
more time than they are expected to spend in search of specific legal provisions. Because of 
these practical difficulties associated with the comparative approach, scholars started favoring 
what was referred to as the “systems approach.”122 The systems approach involves analyzing 
only a representative sample of the world’s legal systems.123 Supporting this approach, A. Pellet 
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 J. C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
113
 Id., p. 26. 
114
 See, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Case 
No. IT-96-22-A, App. Ch., 7 October 1997, para. 40, 55-72. See also, Prosecutor v. Kurpeskic et al., Judgment, Case 
No.IT-95-16-T, T. Ch. II, 14 January 2000, para. 677; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 
T. Ch. II, 10 December 1998, paras. 177-181.  
115
 Prosecutor v. Kurpeskic et al., Judgment, Case No.IT-95-16-T, T. Ch. II, 14 January 2000, para. 677 
116
 Article 21 (1)(c), the Rome Statute.  
117
 See, e.g., supra note 84, RAIMONDO, pp. 28-29.  
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 Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 6 at 11-12 
119
 Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 6 at 11-12. 
120
 Supra note 86, J. G. Lammers, p. 62.  
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 See, e.g., O. J. Lissitzyn, Book Review and Notes, 53 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (1959). 
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 Supra note 105, C. Ford, 69; J. H. Currie et al., 149. 
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wrote that “all modern domestic laws can be gathered into a few families or systems of law 
which, insofar as general principles are concerned, are coherent enough to be considered as 
‘legal systems’.”124 Thus, instead of analyzing all or the prevailing majority of legal systems 
around the world, the systems approach allows deriving a general principle of law by inquiring 
into the legal systems of representative countries. This sub-approach has its own methodological 
challenges: What is a representative sample of the world’s legal systems? Which states are to be 
considered representative of each legal system? How is one to reconcile legal systems used in 
many less-populated states with the legal systems used in states with large populations?    
 
With regard to the scope of the study of the laws of different States, M. Akehurst wrote that legal 
systems “are grouped in families; the law in most English-speaking countries is very similar 
[…]. Once one has proved that a principle exists in English law, there is a high probability that it 
will be found to exist also in New Zealand and Australia.125 It appears that this is exactly what 
happens in the practice of the ICJ. As Virally noted, the fact that ICJ judges are elected in such a 
way as to represent principal legal systems of the world, coincidence of opinion among the 
judges can be sufficient for establishing the rule of general principle of law.126 
 
The second approach, i.e. the categorist approach, involves identifying what is “inherent in the 
very idea/nature of law”127 or “inherently good and necessary ingredients of any functioning 
legal system.”128  In this case, because the inquiry is not whether a specific legal principle can be 
found in the majority or a representative sample of the world’s legal systems, but whether it is 
inherent in the very nature of law, a general principle of law might be derived even from a single 
legal system without any reference to municipal legal systems. Mary Ellen O’Connell, although 
she agreed that general principles of law can be derived by looking into national laws, wrote that 
the categorist approach, i.e. inquiring into the “nature of law, justice and fair process,”129 is more 
a commonly used method by the ICJ. To support her position, she mentioned ICJ’s ruling in the 
Barcelona Traction case about the court’s obligation to apply the law reasonably.130 This 
position also resonates with ICJ’s finding in the Corfu Channel case where the ICJ held that the 
obligation of not allowing knowingly the territory to be used for acts violating the rights of other 
States is a general and well-recognized principle.131 Judge Tanaka’s dissenting opinion in the 
South West Africa case also aligns with this position. After noting that “social and individual 
necessity constitutes one of the guiding factors for the development of law by the way of 
interpretation,” he noted  
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 Supra note 85, A. Pellet, p. 770. 
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 Supra note 108, M. Akehurst, p. 818.  
126
 M. Virally, The Source of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (M. Sorenson 
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 Supra note 105, C. Ford, pp. 73-74. 
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 Supra note 105, J. H. Currie, p. 150  
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 Supra note 92, M. E. O’CONNELL, p. 143. 
130
 Id. 
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 The ICJ held that the Albanian authorities had an obligation to notify the approaching British warships of the 
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[A]lthough the Court does not possess the power to decide a case ex acquo et 
bono without the parties’ agreement […], the result of the interpretation 
mentioned above can satisfy the requirement of justice and good sense.132 
  
E. Root opposed using the categorist approach because he thought that governments would 
mistrust a court which relied on a subjective concept of principles of justice.133 Because 
determination of general principles of law involves the study of the laws of different States with 
different legal systems, “a tribunal which applies general principles of law is less likely to be 
accused of bias, or of acting subjectively and arbitrarily, than a tribunal that applies equity 
unsupported by general principles of law.”134 We agree with this position and believe that the 
comparative approach is a more useful evaluative tool. If the comparative approach requires 
analyzing the majority of the world’s legal systems (or at least a representative number), the 
categorist approach leaves the issue totally at the discretion of the decision-maker and provides 
few guidelines as to how a decision-maker should derive a general principle of law based on the 
categorist approach. The comparative approach allows for a meaningful and straightforward 
method of analyzing domestic legal systems and deriving general principles of law from them. 
This way we can distinguish a widespread presence of a particular principle in domestic legal 
systems and from that derive one general principle of law. The comparative approach allows 
identifying those principles that belong exclusively to a single or minority legal system(s) and 
those shared by the majority.  
 
IV. EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN DOMESTIC LAWS OF DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
A. Introduction  
This section will look at state practice to identify how the exclusionary rule with regard to 
evidence obtained by cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment works in different countries. 
Because our study is of a comparative character and with the aim of identifying general state 
practice, we need to establish the scope of national legal systems to be looked at in as 
representative a way as possible. 
 
There is no doubt that the common and civil law traditions are the largest legal systems. They 
have had tremendous impact in shaping national legal systems of many countries around the 
world, especially of those in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus, any inquiry into national 
laws with the aim of deriving a specific general principle of law should necessarily include an 
analysis of national laws that represents these two legal traditions. In addition to that, we tried to 
focus on countries from different parts of the world. For the purposes of our analysis, we have 
chosen the following countries: Canada, the United States America, Mexico, Argentina, 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Japan, China, and South Africa.    
 
In analyzing different national legal systems pertaining to the admissibility of evidence obtained 
by coercion, we are not looking for strict consistency for the purposes of establishing the 
existence of a general principle of law against the admissibility of coerced confessions. That is 
because small differences in the content of legal rules pertaining to different national legal 
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 Judge Tanaka, Dissenting opinion, South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 278. 
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systems do not impede the ascertainment of a general principle of law.135 What we will be 
looking at is the existence of a common legal principle underlying the legal rule under 
consideration.136 More specifically, our inquiry will primarily focus on whether national laws 
prohibit the admissibility of evidence obtained by CIDT.   
 
B. State Practice 
 
a. Canada 
The modern Canadian exclusionary rule is based on statutory and common law. A general 
provision pertinent to the exclusionary rule can be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms of 1982 (hereinafter Canadian Charter). Its Section 24(2) reads 
Where […] a court concludes the evidence was obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the 
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  
 
Section 24(2) provides for a two-part test for the exclusion of evidence: first, a Court must 
establish whether the defendant’s rights or freedoms under the Canadian Charter have been 
violated; second, if one of the Canadian Charter rights or freedoms were violated, a Court must 
exclude the evidence only if the admission would bring the “administration of justice into 
disrepute.”137  
 
With regard to the first test, i.e. the inquiry into whether the defendant’s rights or freedoms under 
the Canadian Charter were violated, the most relevant provisions are Sections 7,138 9,139 11,140 
12141and 13.142 Among these, it is Section 12 that bears direct relation to the exclusion of coerced 
confessions. Section 12 provides that no one shall be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment. With regard to what constitutes “cruel and unusual,” Justice Laskin interpreted that 
the determination of this clause should be guided by “evolving standards of decency.”143 The 
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 Supra note 84, RAIMONDO, p. 49. 
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 Supra note 108, M. Akehurst, p. 814. 
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on their part that shocks the community.” P. 697; Collins v. The Queen, ….; R v. Grant, paras. 60-62. 
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140
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McCann case144provided a more concrete test. It established that the treatment that (a) serves no 
positive purpose, (b) is unnecessary because of the existence of alternatives, and (c) is not in 
accord with standards of public decency is “cruel and unusual” within the meaning of Section 
12.145 It is obvious that CIDT would violate Section 12 of the Canadian Charter and thus fail the 
first test. The second test is whether violation of Section 12 would bring the “administration of 
justice into disrepute.” Because Canadian common law’s requirement for confessions is the 
voluntariness test,146 the use of CIDT for the purposes of obtaining information would certainly 
bring “administration of justice into disrepute.” In Ibrahim v. The King, the Court held that a 
confession must be a voluntary statement that had not been obtained either by fear of prejudice 
or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority.147 The rule was applied in 
numerous later cases.148 It is important to note that the Ibrahim rule, in clarifying the scope of 
voluntariness requirement, once again affirmed the prohibition of any treatment that would result 
in the “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage.”149 This qualification would certainly include 
cruel and inhuman treatment and any other treatment that might not rise to the level of cruel and 
inhuman treatment, but result in the “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage.” In R. v. Hebert, the 
Court further developed the Ibrahim rule and held that “the absence of violence, threats and 
promises by the authorities does not necessarily mean that the resulting statement is voluntary, if 
the necessary mental element of deciding between alternatives is absent.”150 The emphasis in R. 
v. Hebert to the mental element gave rise to the “operating mind” doctrine that was developed 
later in Horvath v. The Queen151 and R. v. Whittle.152 In these cases, the test for the admissibility 
of confession was whether the statements were freely and voluntarily made even if no hope of 
advantage or fear of prejudice could be found.153  
 
To conclude, the Canadian law prohibits the admissibility of CIDT evidence because it both 
violates Section 12 of the Canadian Charter and consequently brings the administration of justice 
into disrepute (Section 24(2)). CIDT evidence also violates common law’s voluntariness test.    
 
b. The United States of America 
D. Osborn marks the United States to be the “birthplace” of the exclusionary rule.154 US system 
is characterized by a mandatory exclusionary rule. There is no express constitutional or statutory 
                                                          
144
 McCann v. The Queen, 1975.  
145
 McCann v. The Queen, 1975. 
146
 C.M. Bradley, Interrogation and Silence: A Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 280 (2009). 
147
 Ibrahim v. The King, [1914] A.C. 599 (P.C.), at p. 609 
148
 Prosko v. The King (1922), 63 S.C.R. 226, and subsequently applied it in cases like Boudreau v. The King, 
[1949] S.C.R. 262, Fitton, supra,  R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, and Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 
R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.  
149
 “It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that no statement by an accused is 
admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the 
sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out 
by a person in authority.” P. 5 - http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/pdf/JC_Judgments_pre_1999_no_1.pdf   
150
 R v. Hebert, http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990scr2-151/1990scr2-151.html  
151
 Horvath v. The Queen, http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1979/1979scr2-376/1979scr2-376.html  
152
 R v. Whittle, http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1994/1994scr2-914/1994scr2-914.html  
153
 Horvath v. The Queen; R v. Whittle. 
154
 D. Osborn, Suppressing the Truth: Judicial Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence in US, Canada, UK and 
Australia, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 7, Number 4 (December 2000), available at 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n4/osborn74.html (last visited March 20, 2011). For the critique of US 
exclusionary rule and how it can benefit from British and Canadian rules, see L. Glasser, The American 
Working Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate 
 
23 
 
provision that provides for the exclusionary rule in US criminal proceedings. Because of that, 
U.S. courts used provisions of the U.S. Constitution that cover the issue of prohibiting the 
admissibility of evidence obtained by ill-treatment. Those provisions are the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (hereinafter Fifth Amendment) reads: “No person 
[…] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”155 This provision is 
widely known as the Self-Incrimination Clause.156 For the Fifth Amendment to apply, testimony 
must be compelled. In Colorado v. Connecticut, Justice Frankfurter defined voluntary confession 
to be “the product of an essentially free and unrestrained choice by its maker.”157 Some scholars 
expressed views that the test of voluntariness is irrational because the custodial interrogation 
environment is inherently coercive.158 In Miranda v. Arizona,159 the Court admitted that “an 
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic 
forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described in the [standard police 
interrogation manuals] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”160 The Court 
further clarified that for statements obtained under these circumstances to be admissible, 
“adequate protective devices [shall be] employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings.”161 The protective devices that the Court deemed necessary to neutralize the 
compulsion inherent in the interrogation environment became known as “Miranda warnings.”162  
 
The Fourteenth Amendment is also one of the main guarantees against coerced confessions in 
U.S. criminal proceedings. In its relevant part, it reads: “[…] nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
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In Brown v. Mississippi,163 the Supreme Court relied on two rationales: coerced confessions are 
inherently involuntary and the abhorrence of coercing a suspect to confess. With regard to the 
voluntariness test, the Supreme Court relied on the dissenting opinion expressed in the state court 
decision. It quoted in full the dissenting opinion by Judge Griffith who thought that the judgment 
should have been reversed because coerced confessions made the statements involuntary. It 
reads: 
There was thus enough before the court when these confessions were first offered 
to make known to the court that they were not, beyond all reasonable doubt, free 
and voluntary; and the failure of the court then to exclude the confessions is 
sufficient to reverse the judgment.164 
 
With regard to the abhorrence of the act, the Court in Brown v. Mississippi165 referred to Fisher 
v. State,166 where it was held that coercing someone into confessing and then using such 
confession against them “has been the curse of all countries” and that the Constitution prohibits 
such practices.167 In Rochin v. California, Justice Frankfurter held that involuntary confessions 
“are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may 
be independently established as true” because they “offend the community’s sense of fair play 
and decency.”168 
 
Courts relied on different rationales when they excluded coerced confessions. There appears to 
be no general agreement about which rationales are more important than others. The main 
rationales used by the courts are voluntariness, reliability, deterrence and administration of 
justice. In Wolf v. Colorado169 and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, courts held that deterrence of police 
misconduct was the main rationale underlying the exclusionary rule.170 In Rogers v. Richmond, it 
was held that convictions based on involuntary confessions must be excluded not because they 
were unreliable, but because of the methods used.171 The Court explained that “[t]he attention of 
the trial judge should have been focused [on] whether the [police behavior] was such as to 
overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self determined – a 
question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the 
truth.”172 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court’s rationale for the exclusionary rule was that constitutional 
guarantees could be respected only if the incentive to disregard them was removed.173 The Court 
in Spano v. New York also excluded coerced confessions primarily because of the abhorrence of 
the act itself. The Court held that “[t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary 
confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness […] and it turns on the deep-
rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”174 
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c. Mexico 
The 1917 Mexican Constitution laid down the foundations of Mexican criminal procedure. 
Article 19 of the Mexican Constitution provides: “Any ill-treatment during arrest or confinement 
[…] are abuses which shall be punishable by law and repressed by the authorities.” Article 
20(A)(II) of the Mexican Constitution prohibits torture and states that the accused does not have 
to make a statement. Even when the accused decides to make a statement or confession, to have 
evidentiary value, it should be done only before either the Public Prosecutor or a judge, and with 
the assistance of the defense counsel.175  
 
Article 5 of the Federal Law to Prevent and Punish Torture of 1986 states: “No declaration which 
has been obtained through torture can be invoked as evidence.” More relevant to our study is 
Article 287 of the Mexican Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter Criminal Procedure 
Code). According to Article 287 of the Criminal Procedure Code, physical and psychological 
coercion by police or prosecutors to gain information is clearly illegal. Article 287(1) reads: 
A confession rendered before the prosecutor and the judge must comply with the 
following requirements in order to be considered a confession: (I) The statement 
must be made […] without any type of coercion either physical or psychological. 
 
d. Argentina 
Argentina’s new criminal code of 1992 was described to be “exceptionally protective of the 
accused’s rights”176 during interrogation, and it was intended to serve as a model for other Latin 
American countries.177 Article 18 of the Constitution provides that nobody may be compelled to 
testify against himself. Article 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code also provides that “if the 
police violate any of the rules regarding interrogations the statements are nullified.” The same 
article further provides that the police are not authorized to receive statements from the accused 
except for the purposes of learning the accused’s identity. Article 296 of Criminal Procedure 
Code is more relevant for our study. It provides: “Coercion or threats will not be employed 
against the accused nor any means to compel or induce him to give evidence.” 
 
Scholars wrote that the rationale for excluding wrongfully obtained evidence was mostly 
grounded on ethical grounds rather than pursuing the policy objective of deterring police 
misconduct.178 Indeed, in suppressing illegally obtained evidence, the Argentinean Supreme 
Court relied on such values as morality, security and privacy. In the Charles Hermanos case, 
referring to the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search, the Supreme Court held that 
“the law, in the name of morality, security and privacy […] compels inadmissibility of such 
evidence against the defendants.”179 Thus, the police deterrence rationale of exclusionary rule, 
though occasionally referred to, does not appear to be the dominant rationale behind Argentina’s 
constitutional jurisprudence.  
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It should be noted that Article 8(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that 
“[a] confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made without coercion of any 
kind.”180 Though the American Convention’s Article 5(2) prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, there is little guidance for determining what constitutes coercion as 
such.181 No doubt, acts prohibited in Article 5(2), i.e. torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, are coercive acts and thus at a minimum any of them should trigger Article 8(3).  
 
e. Germany 
The German Constitution of 1949182 has important provisions that create a firm foundation for 
the exclusionary rule. It was described as a “yardstick” for all decisions by the Federal 
Constitutional Court.183 Article 1(1) of the German Constitution reads: “The dignity of the 
person is sacrosanct. It is the duty of all State powers to respect and protect it.” In 1954, the 
German Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision is a “guiding principle” that 
applies “in an unrestricted manner also to a person suspected of having committed a crime.”184  
 
The German exclusionary rule is composed of a two-step analysis involving consideration of the 
principle of the rule of law and proportionality.185 First, the court determines whether the 
evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the principle of the rule of law.186 If yes, then the 
evidence is excluded. C. Bradley notes that the principle of the rule of law is “the principle [that] 
serves to preserve the purity of the judicial process [and thus] evidence obtained by means of 
brutality or deceit must be excluded.” 187 It appears that if there is any measure of illegal coercion 
used to obtain evidence, then that type of evidence should be excluded. 
 
If the evidence is not excluded in the first step, the court then considers Verhältnismässigkeit. 
The concept of Verhältnismässigkeit refers to the principle of proportionality.188 Under this 
                                                          
180
 For the analysis of exclusion of evidence under the American Convention on Human Rights, see The Exclusion 
of Coerced Confessions and the Regulation of Custodial Interrogation under the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev., 97 (1994-1995). 
181
 Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court sheds more light to the meaning of coercion. In Velasquez Rodriguez 
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of any detainee to respect for his inherent dignity as a human being.” See, Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Judgment of 
July 28, 1988, Ser. C No. 4, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 156.  
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APPROACH 91 (Carolina Academic Press, 2002).  
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 Supra note 182, C. M. Bradley, p. 1034. 
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 Id., p. 1041. 
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doctrine, the methods used in fighting crime must be proportional to the “seriousness of the 
offense and the strength of the suspicion” as well as to the constitutional interests at stake.189 
 
The German Procedure Code190 deals with coerced confessions in a more detailed manner and 
has provisions specifically dealing with coerced confessions. Its Section 136a entitled 
“Prohibited Methods of Examination” reads: 
(1) The accused's freedom to make up his mind and to manifest his will shall not 
be impaired by ill-treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference, 
administration of drugs, torment, deception or hypnosis. Coercion may be used 
only as far as this is permitted by criminal procedure law. Threatening the accused 
with measures not permitted under its provisions or holding out the prospect of an 
advantage not envisaged by statute shall be prohibited. 
(2) Measures which impair the accused's memory or his ability to understand 
shall not be permitted. 
(3) The prohibition under subsections (1) and (2) shall apply irrespective of the 
accused's consent. Statements which were obtained in breach of this prohibition 
shall not be used, even if the accused agrees to their use. 
 
Section 136a of the German Procedure Code is very detailed with regard to permitted methods of 
investigation. It prohibits not only ill-treatment and torture as such, but also using fatigue, any 
other physical interference, dispensing medicine, using deception, hypnosis etc. Notably, the last 
paragraph of Section 136a specifically provides that “[s]tatements which were obtained in 
violation of these prohibitions shall not be used even if the accused agrees to said use.” Thus 
coerced confessions would certainly not pass the first prong of the above-described two-step 
analysis.  
 
Emphasizing the importance of voluntary confessions, the German Supreme Court held that 
“[t]he accused is a participant in, not the object of, a criminal proceeding” and that “[t]he 
accused’s freedom of decision as to how to answer the charge remains by law inviolable at every 
stage of the proceedings.”191 Based on this way of looking at the voluntariness requirement of 
confessions, the Court held that a polygraph examination was inadmissible because it “violate[d] 
[accused’s] freedom to determine and exercise his will.”192  
 
In 1992, the German Supreme Court first held that it is only the accused alone who can make the 
decision if he will give a statement, and then held that police officials violated the suspect’s 
procedural rights when they stated that they would continue the interrogation “until clarity 
reigned.”193 In another case, the German Supreme Court held that the statements of the defendant 
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 Id. For the scope of the principles of proportionality under German constitutional law, see G. L. Neuman, The 
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can be used because there were no “[i]ndications that the defendant’s free determination of his 
will had been influenced by the interrogating official through force or deception […]. Especially 
any evidence of excessive fatigue of the accused is absent […].”194   
 
f. The United Kingdom 
In general, the English courts are not concerned with how evidence is obtained.195 In R. v. 
Leatham, the Court held that “[i]t matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be 
admissible in evidence.”196 In another case, the court held that “[i]t would be a dangerous 
obstacle to the administration of justice […] to hold because evidence was obtained by illegal 
means it could not be used against a party charged with an offense.”197 This is the reason why the 
English position on illegally obtained evidence was described as the “antithesis” of the American 
position.198 According to the English position, relevant and reliable evidence is admissible even 
though obtained illegally.199 This is because the British courts have repudiated the idea of using 
exclusion as a deterrent against illegal police activity.200 David Feldman commented that in the 
UK “the fact that evidence has been obtained by improper or unlawful means does not 
necessarily […] make evidence of the discovery inadmissible or excluded at trial.”201 Cases 
involving real evidence are almost always decided against the accused. The likely explanation 
for this is that real evidence is seen to be extremely reliable and to exist independently of any 
police misconduct, making it difficult to demonstrate how its admission could possibly operate 
unfairly against the accused. 
 
Though English law permits the admission of illegally obtained evidence as long as it is relevant 
and reliable, it has long considered confessions that were not free and voluntary as unreliable and 
hence inadmissible.202 The 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recommended that 
Parliament regulate the interrogation of suspects, including defining when the automatic 
exclusion of statements would be required.203 This was achieved with the adoption of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (hereinafter PACE 1984).204 PACE was described to be “the 
most important legislation”205 regulating criminal procedure. Section 78(a) of PACE formulates 
the exclusionary rule as follows:  
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposed to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
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regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence 
was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.  
 
There is an additional and stricter rule applicable to confessions. Para. 76(2) of PACE 1984 
provides for the mandatory exclusion of confessions if they were obtained “by oppression.” The 
same paragraph further clarifies that “oppression” includes torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, and the use or threat of violence.” In Regina v. Fulling, the English Court of Appeal 
held “the word oppression means something above and beyond that which is inherently 
oppressive in police custody and must import some impropriety, some oppression actively 
applied in an improper manner by the police.”206 The Court further noted that “oppression” 
should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, and relied on its definition in the Oxford 
English Dictionary.207 
In A and Others case, Lord Bingham208 noted that PACEs Section 72 prohibition of oppression 
for the purposes of obtaining confession expresses the common law rule established in Ibrahim v 
The King,209 R v Harz and Power,210 and Lam Chi-ming v The Queen.211 Lord Bingham noted 
that alternatively, evidence obtained by ill-treatment should also be excluded under PACE’s 
Section 78 because of its adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings.212 Lord Hoffman 
appears to lean towards this rationale too. Writing about the reasons for excluding coerced 
evidence, he wrote that the main purpose was to “uphold the integrity of the administration of 
justice.”213  
g. Russian Federation 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter Russian Constitution) contains a number 
of articles guaranteeing civil liberties during interrogation: its Article 21 prohibits torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment, Article 50 prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence and 
Article 51 guarantees the right against self-incrimination. These rights are implemented by the 
Criminal Procedure Code. The Russian Federation enacted a new Criminal Procedure Code in 
December 2001.214  
 
The Russian Constitution provides for the exclusionary rule. Its Article 50 reads: “In 
administering justice, it shall not be allowed to use evidence received by violating federal law.” 
It should be noted that the “federal law” to which Article 50 refers includes, among other 
documents, the Constitution itself, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus 
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evidence obtained in violation of any of the provisions of these laws must be excluded. The 
Russian Constitution and the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code prohibit torture and other forms of 
ill-treatment. Paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the RF Constitution provides that “[h]uman dignity 
shall be protected by the State” and that “[n]othing may serve as a basis for its derogation.” 
Paragraph 2 of the same article then provides  
No one shall be subject to torture, violence or other severe or humiliating 
treatment or punishment. No one may be subject to medical, scientific and other 
experiments without voluntary consent. 
 
It is clear that Article 21 of the Russian Constitution explicitly prohibits torture. Though the 
same article does not mention cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as such, it prohibits 
“violence, or other severe or humiliating treatment or punishment.” This clause would certainly 
include CIDT. Articles 9 and 75 of the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code215 implement Articles 21 
and 50 of the Russian Constitution by prohibiting torture and other forms of ill-treatment, as well 
as providing for the exclusionary rule. Article 9(2) of the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code reads  
No one of the participants in criminal court proceedings shall be subjected to 
violence or torture or to other kinds of cruel or humiliating treatment, degrading 
his human dignity. 
 
Article 75 of the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code provides for the exclusionary rule. The article 
first declares that inadmissible proof is “deprived of legal force and cannot serve as a basis for 
the accusation or be used for proving any one of the circumstances listed in Article 73216 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code.” Its Paragraph 2 then provides for the scope of inadmissible proof. 
Under “Referred as inadmissible proof shall be,” it lists the following concrete circumstances 
that lead to the inadmissibility of evidence: (a) evidence given by the suspect and by the accused 
in the course of the pre-trial proceedings of the criminal case in the absence of the defense 
counsel, including the cases of the refusal from counsel for the defense, and not confirmed by the 
suspect and by the accused in the court; (b) evidence of the victim and of the witness, based on a 
surmise, a supposition or hearsay, as well as the testimony of the witness, who cannot indicate 
the source of his knowledge; and (c) other evidence, obtained in violation of the demands of the 
present Code. 
 
Interestingly, the above circumstances do not mention the inadmissibility of torture and CIDT 
evidence.217 The prohibition of torture and CIDT evidence can only be inferred from “other 
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proof, obtained in violation of the demands of the present Code” clause218 which would certainly 
trigger the prohibition found in Article 9(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code that prohibits 
“violence or torture or to other kinds of cruel or humiliating treatment, degrading his human 
dignity.” 
 
h. South Africa 
Though the South African legal system is largely based upon Roman-Dutch law,219 its evidence 
law is based on the English law of evidence.220 Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the 
main due process guarantees and forms the cornerstone of the South African criminal justice 
system.221 It first provides for an extremely long list of procedural guarantees.222 Among the ones 
that have direct bearing on the exclusionary rule, Section 35 guarantees the right to remain silent 
and not to be compelled to make any confessions or admission that could be used in evidence 
against oneself. The final paragraph of Section 35 also provides that  
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be 
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
 
The clause of “would render the trial unfair” and ”otherwise be detrimental to the administration 
of justice” in Section 35(5) were borrowed from the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,223 which requires the exclusion of evidence only if, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the admission of the evidence would “bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.” South African courts relied on the Canadian jurisprudence for the interpretation of 
Section 35 as well.224  
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Section 35 provides a two-step analysis for excluding evidence. The evidence obtained in a 
manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded only where admission of it 
would render the trial unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
Coerced evidence would not pass the first prong of the two-step analysis established by Section 
35 (5), i.e. whether the evidence obtained in such a manner that violates any of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights. It would violate Section 12(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees that everyone 
has the right to freedom and security of person, which includes, among others, the right (a) to be 
free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; (b) not to be tortured in any 
way, and (c) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
  
Coerced evidence would also be prohibited under South African criminal procedure law. 
Provisions regulating the process of interrogation and admission of confessions are 
largely regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Section 217 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides that a confession must be made freely and voluntarily 
whilst the maker is in his sound and sober senses and was not influenced in any way.225  
 
Thus, for a statement to be admissible, the prosecution must show that it was (a) made freely and 
voluntarily by a person in his sound and sober senses and (b) without undue influence. For the 
purposes of Section 217, a person is considered to be in his sound and sober senses unless s/he is 
unable to know what s/he is saying.226 David Zeffert proposed that an “undue influence” test is a 
better approach then the test of voluntariness because it has wider scope to include unduly 
lengthy interrogation, subjection to fatigue and the exploitation of weaknesses such as poor 
education or youthful immaturity.227 Clarifying what practices constitute undue influence, he 
referred to case law that held that a practice is undue when a person’s freedom of will is impaired 
in any way.228 In S v. Mpetha, the Court held that continued interrogation after an accused has 
asserted his right to remain silent will be viewed as undue influence.229  
 
There is no doubt that the “undue influence” approach to the admissibility of evidence would 
prohibit any use of torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. In addition to the fact that 
unduly influenced statements can be unreliable, the South African courts also exclude such 
statements because they render trials unfair and their practice is abhorrent to civilized values.230 
In S v. Tandwa, the court held that evidence obtained as a result of ill-treatment shall be excluded 
because of its “stain” on the administration of justice.231 
 
i. Japan 
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The modern Japanese legal system has many attributes of a civil law system. It was significantly 
influenced by the French, German and American legal systems232 and thus its legal system was 
described as the “Japanization” of foreign law.233 
   
Article 97 of the Japanese Constitution provides that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the 
nation. The Constitution sets out three fundamental principles: first, sovereignty rests with the 
people; second, peaceful cooperation with foreign nations; and third, the respect for fundamental 
human rights.234 Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees due process of law and states 
that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be 
imposed, except in accordance with the procedures established by law. H. Oda noted that this 
provision was modeled on the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which also deals 
primarily with procedural due process.235   
 
The use of torture and cruel punishment by government officials is strictly prohibited. Article 36 
of the Constitution reads: “The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments 
are absolutely prohibited.” Article 38 provides for the exclusionary rule. After providing for the 
right against self-incrimination, its paragraph 2 states that “[c]onfession made under compulsion, 
torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence.” In Abe 
v. Japan, the plaintiff was told by the prosecutors that he would be freed if he confessed. He did 
so and was indicted. When the case was appealed and went to the Supreme Court, the latter held: 
Where, as in this case, the suspect made a confession in reliance upon a statement 
of a public procurator to the effect that the case would be dropped if the suspect 
confessed, such a confession should be held to be inadmissible on the ground that 
there is doubt as to its voluntary nature.236 
 
Nevertheless, the wording of Article 38 remains vague, especially with regard to the term 
“compulsion.” With regard to the modern use of physical violence during interrogation, R. 
Hirano noted 
The real problem is that confession cannot be obtained without somewhat severe 
questioning. At present it is probably safe to say that there is virtually no use of 
direct physical violence. It is also safe to say, however, that indirect techniques 
and psychological pressure are used to some extent at all times. Moreover, the 
line between proper and improper uses of such pressure is not truly clear.237 
 
j. China 
Article 43 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code provides that “it shall be strictly forbidden to 
extort confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other 
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unlawful means.” Although such police conduct is clearly prohibited, Chinese law does not 
provide for the exclusion of evidence obtained illegally and does not provide for a procedure to 
determine whether unlawful means were used to obtain a confession.238 This problem was 
remedied with the adoption of a new set of rules regulating the admission of evidence in criminal 
trials. On June 25, 2010, Chinese law-enforcement institutions239 published “Rules Concerning 
Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases” (hereinafter Rules 
of Exclusion).240 Article 2 of the Rules of Exclusion prohibits the admissibility of illegal oral 
evidence. The definition of “illegal oral evidence” can be found in Article 1 that reads 
The category of illegal oral evidence includes statements by criminal suspects or 
defendants obtained through illegal means such as coerced confession as well as 
witness testimony or victim statements obtained through illegal means such as use 
of violence or threats. 
 
The prohibition of illegal oral evidence is wide enough to include evidence obtained by 
CIDT because Article 1 provides that any statement obtained through the use of coercion, 
violence or threats becomes illegal oral evidence. We believe that this article should be 
read in conjunction with Article 43 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code that 
prohibits collecting evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means. Thus, 
even though Article 1 does not specify what type of treatment should be regarded as 
constituting coercion, violence or threats, it would be fair to assume that cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment falls under one or all of the prohibited treatments provided in 
Article 1 of the Rules of Evidence or Article 43 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The paper addressed how the exclusionary rule found in UNCAT’s Article 15 should apply to 
CIDT evidence. Article 15 prohibits the admissibility of evidence obtained by torture and fails to 
extend similar prohibition to the CIDT evidence. Nowak argued that Article 15 equally applied 
to CIDT evidence and advanced two proposals. Because Nowak proposed that the second one is 
weightier than the first one, we only addressed the second argument.241 Nowak’s second 
proposal relied on his interpretation of what distinguished torture from CIDT. He argued that it 
was the purpose of conduct, not severity of it, which distinguishes torture from CIDT. If we 
assume the correctness of this approach, then there is no need to worry about the inclusion of 
CIDT in Article 15’s exclusionary rule because whenever CIDT is used for a specific purpose, 
e.g., the extraction of information, it becomes torture and automatically prohibited by the 
exclusionary rule found in Article 15.  
 
To assess the merits of Nowak’s approach, the paper first investigated negotiation history. It was 
revealed that Nowak’s approach that differentiated torture from CIDT based on the purpose of 
conduct enjoyed little support. The negotiation history also showed that drafters intended CAT’s 
                                                          
238
 C. Bradley, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, p. 101. 
239
 The Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State 
Security, and Ministry of Justice.  
240
 Full text of the Rule of Evidence is available at http://www.duihua.org/hrjournal/evidence/rules_criminal.htm 
(last visited on March 15, 2011). 
241
 The first proposal relied on systematic interpretation of Article 15 and 16 in light of the negotiating history and 
purpose of both articles. Because Article 15, though related to criminal prosecution, also has a preventive purpose, it 
should be interpreted broadly to include CIDT evidence. 
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exclusionary rule to be applicable strictly to torture. This is another indication that the drafters 
did not consider the purposive element of torture to be the decisive criterion in distinguishing it 
from CIDT. 
 
Afterwards, this paper proposed that general principles of law provide a better guidance. To 
demonstrate this, we first defined general principles of law as constituting fundamental legal 
norms common to different legal systems. With regard to how to derive a general principle of 
law, this paper examined three primary approaches: comparativist, systems and categorist. The 
paper favored the systems approach, which requires analyzing only a representative sample of 
world’s legal systems to determine the existence of relevant general principles of law. 
Subsequently, in order to establish the existence of a general principle of law that prohibits CIDT 
evidence, the paper analyzed national laws of ten different countries: Canada, the United States, 
Argentina, Mexico, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, China, Russia, and South Africa. This 
paper focused on how the national laws of these countries regulate the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by CIDT. Such an inquiry revealed that the national laws under consideration 
prohibited the admissibility of both torture and CIDT evidence. Consequently, this paper 
concludes that there is already a rule in international law that prohibits, through a general 
principle of law, the admissibility of CIDT evidence.   
 
 
